Engineering Truths About North Korea’s Missile Threat

Following the recent North Korean test of an ICBM over the Western Pacific Ocean, the mainstream media is crying “Red Alert,” especially when it comes to the far-flung U.S. territory of Guam and the state of Hawaii.

However, you won’t find any engineering firms or manufacturers practicing “Duck and Cover” drills any time soon.

That’s because with just a little background knowledge on the science of intercontinental ballistic missiles, North Korea’s threats sound much less credible. In this video, we explain why you shouldn’t lose any sleep over this sensational story.

Guiding the launch vehicle into the correct trajectory is the essential first step. Early, ground-based radio command guidance systems are easily jammed, and more secure inertial guidance systems are far more complex, especially for a Third World nation like North Korea. Gyroscopes create an onboard stable inertial platform which, when combined with accelerometers, can be used to provide steering inputs for the missile, but they need preprogrammed starting position data, making submarine launches even more complex.

Once out of the atmosphere, the warhead must separate successfully from the second stage without causing it to tumble or lose stability. As the warhead falls towards the atmosphere, it must orient itself with the heatshield downward, either through aerodynamic forces or by using a reaction control system guided by gyroscopes or horizon scanners.

The warhead must then survive the atmosphere using a heatshield designed to ablate, or progressively erode, and carry away the frictional heat while ensuring temperatures within the warhead remain low enough to protect sensitive electronics and the bomb itself.

Then, if the missile survives all those events, it must have some mechanism to explode the bomb at a predetermined height above the surface at the target. This would require a radar and/or barometric fusing system. If the missile is simply designed to explode on impact, the attack will not inflict maximum damage.

And, of course, the bomb itself must work. Seismic readings of past tests are suspiciously low yield — low enough to suspect a fizzle rather than a bang.

Lastly, miniaturizing a warhead into a form light enough to be carried by an ICBM is a formidable task by itself, and North Korea isn’t exactly well known for its advanced electronics industry.

In conclusion, the notion that one of the world’s poorest countries can simultaneously develop miniaturized atomic bombs and the multi-stage intercontinental ballistic missiles to carry them is difficult to believe.

Tell us what you think in the comments below. 

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